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INTRODUCTION
This report reviews literature in the English language
pertaining to coal in the European Coal and Steel Community.
It begins with a brief description of the European Coal
and Steel Community, its formation, its government, and its
purposes regarding the goals of adequate production and good
working conditions in the Community. The market structure
of the production and distribution of coal is discussed.
The efforts of the High Authority to achieve goals concerning
competition are reviewed and the success of their efforts
appraised.
The decline of the coal industry in the fuel market of
the ECSC countries since 1957 is next described. The policies
of the High Authority in dealing with adjustment problems
associated with the decline of the coal industry are reviewed.
The report ends with a discussion of some possible
actions which might be taken to deal with the problems created
by the decline in demand for coal.
Formation of the European Coal
and Steel Community
The European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) was formed
on April 18, 1951, by treaty ratified to be in force for
fifty years. The six nations to sign the treaty were
Belgium, France, The German Federal Republic, Italy,
Luxembourg, and the Netherlands. The founding of the ECSC
was the outgrowth of a proposal of the French Foreign
Minister Robert Schuman, often referred to as the Schuman
Plan
.
The ECSC was formed for several reasons. First, the
smallness of national markets cramped economic development
and retarded improvement in the living standards of the
member nations. Second, the creation of large internal
markets was essential to the member countries to allow more
efficient producers to expand operations, in a world now
undergoing radical changes. Next, the resources of the member
nations could be used more efficiently if they had common
institutions, responsible for taking a comprehensive view of
the European picture and empowered to make decisions for the
general good. Finally the ECSC could facilitate the pro-
vision of a regular supply of coal and steel at reasonable
prices.
^-ECSC 1962, High Authority Spokesman's Office, Informa-
tion service of The European Communities, September, 1962,
Luxembourg
.
The ECSC proposal was intended to meet the above prin-
ciples by making the coal and steel of the six countries
available without tariff restrictions to all the 170 million
customers of the Community. Also by establishing a common
market it was hoped that all customers could be supplied at
a supposedly best price. By ending sales, transport, and
production Inequalities often caused by subsidies and market
discrimination, through instituting common rules of competi-
tion conditions would be improved. The ECSC would also
create financing and marketing conditions which would enable
the most efficient producers to expand their operations. The
ECSC adopted a policy ensuring that the burden of economic
and technical change such as unemployment was not borne by
the workers. Finally the ECSC would give the power to imple-
ment and carry out tasks as an independent authority.
After the ECSC was formed in 1951 and began to show some
success, the basic principles on which it was based were ex-
panded leading to the formation of the European Economic
Community (EEC) in 1957. Still later came Euratom, and today
the ECSC and the EEC and Euratom together comprise the
European Community. In effect the ECSC was a limited scale
experiment with the common market concept. Tariff and quota
restrictions on coal and steel were abolished, discrimina-
tory transport rates were supposedly abolished, a common
pool of labor and investment funds was created, and a regu-
latory authority was established to supervise the entire
community.
Notably missing from membership in the ECSC is Great
Britain. At the time of the formation of the ECSC, Great
Britain consulted with the French over possible membership
in the proposed institution but decided not to take part in
the conference which drafted the Treaty. The kind of pooling
of resources that the French had in mind was opposed by the
British National Coal Board and to a lesser extent the
British Steel Industry.
Probably the strongest reason for the British not
participating in the conference and the ECSC was political.
Although Sir Winston Churchill had indicated some personal
support for regional integration, the British Labour Govern-
ment strongly opposed British membership. The suggestion of
British membership in a European coal and steel community was,
in 1950, received by members of the Labour Government with
unfriendly reactions ranging from cold to openly hostile.
Acceptance of the ECSC within the countries that signed
the Treaty was not always without political opposition.
Even in France, the home of Schuman and Monnet, there was
strong opposition to the ECSC as witnessed by the bulk of
the Gaullist party voting against the ratification of the
Treaty. Some minor political opposition remains even today
'•Miriam Camps, Britain and the European Community 1955-
1963 , Princeton, New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1964,
pp. 11-12.
Colin Clark, The Common Market and British Trade , New
York, Frederick A. Prager, 1962~ p. 8.
to the ECSC. For example, in the election of 1961, the Com-
munists in Belgium blamed the ECSC for putting Belgium miners
out of work by closing unproductive mines. Today most all
political parties in- the ECSC including the Gaullists, with
perhaps the notible exception of the Communists, approve of
their country's membership in the ECSC.
1Richard Mayne, The Community of Europe, New York,
W.W. Norton and Company, Inc., 1962.
Regulation of the ECSC
The governing body of the ECSC is the High Authority.
The High Authority is the Executive of the ECSC. Its task
is to achieve the Community's objectives as outlined by the
Treaty. It is vested with supranational powers, enjoys
financial independence, and represents the Community in its
relations with the rest of the World. It supervises and
enforces the rules of the Community. The High Authority is
composed of nine members, who are appointed partly through
nomination by the National Governments, and partly by co-
option. Attached to the High Authority is the Consultative
Committee composed of 51 members.
After the formation of the European Community three
other institutions associated with the ECSC came :nto being.
First was the Council of Ministers which is the Community
institution that co-ordinates the work of the High Authority
with that of the member National Governments. Next is the
European Parliament, made up of 142 members representing the
people of the member countries apportioned approximately by
populations. Third is the Court of Justice which is respons-
ible for ensuring the legal rights and responsibilities as
laid down by the ECSC's constitution, the Treaty.
The Court of Justice has been active in ECSC affairs as
it has decided important cases affecting ECSC policy regarding
cartels and concentrations. The Court is mainly involved
in judicial review of decisions of the High Authority dealing
with legal problems which may arise from the interpretation
and application of the Treaty. Member governments, corpor-
ations and individuals have access to the Court of Justice
under certain specified conditions.
Figure 1 shows the organization of the European
Community Governments.
Henry A.K. Junckerstorff , Internat ional Manual on
The European Economic Community
,
St. Louis, Saint Louis
University Press, 1963, p. 58.
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Current Developments in the European
Community Government
The European Community is presently involved in merging
the three separate Communities into one unified Community
under one government. The Brussels Treaty of April 8, 1965
j
went into force on July 1, 196?. This began with a unifi-
cation of the Councils and Commissions as a primary step in
uniting the Communities.
The executive branches of the European Economic Com-
munity, the European Atomic Energy Community, and the
European Coal and Steel Community have now been united.
The six member European Council of Ministers has assumed its
duties and formally appointed 1/, members of the new European
Commission, which assumed its duties on July 6, 1967. Until
the three treaties themselves have been consolidated, how-
ever, the new European executives will administer three
original treaties of the Communities.
The European Council of Ministers underwent some insti-
tutional changes in its organization. The three councils
have shared the same Secretariat since 1956. Now, the ECSC
Special Council of Ministers has been amalgamated with the
EEC and Euratom Councils. The European Commission has been
reduced to nine members serving four year terms. This is
reduced from 14 on the old commission which was the High
-'-Jean Rey, "July 1, 1967" European Community, July-August
1967, Publications Department of the European Communities,
Brussels, pp. 3-4-
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Authority plus the Euratom Commission. Commission members
will be appointed by mutxial agreement of national govern-
ments. The merger treaty does not alter the powers or
responsibilities of the institutions or their relations
with one another. The single Commission will exercise the
powers and responsibilities which were formerly the respons-
ibility of the High Authority and the Commissions and will
be responsible to the European Parliament for its actions.
A more important role is allocated to the European Parliament
under the new treaty than under the ECSC Treaty. *-
The merger of the Community's three governments into
one is now taking place. This new government has not yet
had time to make itself felt in the ECSC and is at present
operating, with regards to coal, under the ECSC Treaty of
1951. Since the new government will probably not make major
changes in the High Authority's policies and since it has
not totally evolved as a working unit at this time, this
report will consider the ECSC for only the period that it
was governed by the High Authority.
'"New Institutions" European Community July-August
1967, Publications Department of the European Communities,
Brussels, p. 4.
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Application of the Principles of the Treaty
Firms operating under the ECSC are basically free to
set their prices. The ECSC attempts to keep competition
fair by requiring that prices be disclosed to allow greater
market knowledge and help avoid unfair price discrimination.
To achieve this the High Authority requires all firms to
publish price lists and to adhere to them with some
specified exceptions. The exceptions basically permit
firms to meet competition thus allowing for a somewhat
flexible market. To date this goal has been fairly suc-
cessfully fulfilled. 1 The ECSC does, however, have the
power to impose maximum and minimum prices and introduce
compensation schemes.
The ECSC has a goal of prohibiting producers or groups
of producers from exercising or controlling other producers
or the market through price or market fixing, through private
agreements, either explicit (cartels) or implicit (concerted
practices). It should be noted that regulated cartels are
tolerated under some conditions. The ECSC Treaty contains,
however, probably the strongest legal basis for anti-trust
2
operations yet seen in Western Europe.
ifiCSC 1962 op_. cit . , p. 1/|.
2
"Twenty Questions," European C ommunity,, March 1964,
Publications Department of the European Communities, Brussels,
p. 2.
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Agreements among firms are usually forbidden but,
specified agreements under some conditions can be authorized,
by the High Authority. All mergers among firms under the
ECSC's authority must be approved by the High Authority.
National governments have little if any influence or
authorization to deal with firms under the ECSC in matters
over which the ECSC has jurisdiction.
Since the cost of transportation is an extremely im-
portant element in the coal and steel markets, the ECSC
has adopted rules for the purpose of maintaining fair
competition. It has attempted first to abolish discrimin-
ation in rates, secondly to introduce new international
rates making it more feasible to ship between member nations,
and thirdly to harmonize transportation rates and conditions
for treaty products.
The first two objectives were quickly achieved for rail
transportation. As for the third many problems still exist.
There is still a great deal to be done in other forms of
transportation such as inland water and motor transportation
where there are no definite rate-making arrangements in some
member countries. In rail transportation of ECSC products,
2
significant rate reductions have been realized.
l-ECSC 1962, op_. cit . , p. 16.
2Ibid
.
,
p. 16.
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The High Authority has the task of stimulating growth
through investment in the industries under its control. This
it has done by granting or guaranteeing loans to firms. Loans
have come from within, as well as outside the Community. The
High Authority was given power to levy a tax on annual turn-
over which recently was fixed at the rate of 0.25$ of turn-
over .
Initially the ECSC was quite successful in stimulating
capital expenditure. This was especially important before
1957 when there was a shortage in the coal market. Since
then, coal mining has turned into a condition of glut and
producers in many cases are attempting to cut rather than
raise their total production. In some cases coal producers
are attempting to modernize their production to increase
efficiency. Capital expenditures reached a high in the ECSC
coal industry in 1957 when some 478 million dollars were
invested. Since then capital expenditures for coal have
dropped off slightly, falling to 377 million dollars in
1961. Coal mining investment has been further aggravated
by conditions in the ECSC steel industry, a major customer
and owner of ECSC coal producers. In 1961 ECSC steel pro-
duction dropped and large surpluses of steel began to pile
up. These surpluses remained at a high level for the next
John Caiman, ed. The Common Market , London, Anthony
Blond, 1967, p. W.
2ECSC 1962, op_. Cit.
,
p. 18.
u1
four to six years.
It now appears that the High Authority, so anxious to
promote investment during the 1950' s, may have been too
successful in achieving this end.
••"Europe Finds Growth Can Boomerang," Business Week ,
June A, 1966, pp. 63-80, Number 1918.
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CARTELS AND CONCENTRATIONS
Cartels and Concentrations in the ECSC
Countries Before the Treaty
Traditionally in Western and Central Europe, cartels,
both national and international, have been commonplace if
not predominant in both the steel and coal industries. In
coal mining, monopolies, both private and public, were the
rule although usually limited to a national scale. The coal
mines of France were nationalized at the end of World War
II as part of a practice to allow marginal industries to
survive at public expense. Two-thirds of the Netherlands
"production was owned and operated by the government under
a law passed in 1908, and designed to forestall domination
of the industry by foreign capital. Public ownership dates
back into the latter part of the nineteenth century when the
Prussian state acquired the Saar mines. Proprietorship often
changed with the uncertain political status of the region.
Although the overwhelming majority of the Ruhr coal mines
remained in private hands, at least SO per cent of their
production fell under the control of a sales cartel founded
as early as 1893 with the approval of the German government.
In 1934 this cartel (Rheinish-Westfalishes Kohnensyndikat
)
extended its influence over output to the Aachen area.
Belgium alone was predominated by private ownership with two
concerns, the Societe Generale and Launoit, controlling half
of her output. In addition a sales cartel, the Comptoir
16
Beige des Charbons (COBECHAR), controlled some 60 per cent
of the national output and the prices of the remaining
independents as well. After World War II, Luxembourg,
which mines little if any coal, authorized her Office
Commercial du Ravitaillement to control all imports of coal.
Italy has never mined coal in significant quantities and
therefore, relies on coal imports for most of her solid
fuel requirements.
The Stec] industry, which has been and still is a large
buyer of coal and, therefore, in a position to influence
coal output and prices, has also been traditionally typified
by cartels. Unlike coal, steel cartels have often been
international in scope. The Cartel was the main form of
organization of big European steel companies in the 1920'
s
and 1930' s. The International Steel Cartel, supported by
steelmakers in Austria, Belgium, Czechoslovokia, France,
Germany, Hungary, Luxembourg, and the Saar, functioned from
1926 to I.93O, and was again revived in 1933 and tried to come
alive again just before World War II. It controlled at its
height, one-third of the world's steel production and two-
pthirds of its exports.
Fearful of another revival of international cartels in
steel and a revival of the old coal cartel pattern in the
Hans A. Schmitt, "The European Coal and Steel Community:
Operations of the First European Antitrust Law, 1952-1958,
Business History Review
, Vol. XXXVIII, Spring 1964, pp. 102-104.
2Ibid
. , p. 103.
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late 1940' s it is understandable why nations such as France
were anxious to have some form of international regulation of
coal and steel production practices. France was particularly
worried about German steel which had provided much of the
might that allowed Germany to fight two World Wars. It
should also be noted that Germany has the large coal deposits
while France has large iron ore deposits. It has often been
the case that the iron ore moves to the coal; that is, the
large steel producing areas grow up mainly around the coal
and not iron ore deposits. This is the case because it
is more economical to ship iron ore than it is coal for the
manufacture of steel. This is one reason why the German Ruhr
has traditionally been a larger producer of steel than the
iron ore abundant areas of France.
The French determination as could be seen by the actions
of authors of the Schurnan Plan, was to establish genuine
competition in industries where it had been virtually unknown.
During the negotiations which led to the formation of the
European Coal and Steel Community, the French delegation
stubbornly defended those features of the project which
prohibited economic combinations in restraint of trade. It
was noted that the community-to be must increase production
and that past cartels had had as their purpose to control
and reduce output, therefore, control of cartels was Impor-
tant. German and Belgian objections to this policy were
voiced claiming that it would regulate business, as well as
18
cause jurisdictional conflicts with the national governments.
Such objections failed to shake the French. Their reasoning
was political rather than economic. The French knew that
unless some limitations were imposed on formation of cartels
under the Treaty, fear of German industrial recovery would
defeat the Treaty in the National Assembly. The Germans,
who saw in the Schuman Plan the means by which they could
escape from the tutelage of the International Ruhr Authority,
finally conceded the point, rather than risk complete failure.
The symbolic importance of the Schuman Plan was very
important because it symbolized the end of Franco-German
quarrels, as many believed that the new coal-and-steel pool
would make war between France and Germany henceforth impos-
sible. 2
1Ibid
., p. 10/,.
2Hortlo W. Clark, The Politics of the Common Market,
Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, Prentice-Hall, Inc., 19t>7,
p. 7.
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Oligopoly and the ECSC Coal Industry
"The coal and steel markets are, at all events at
producer level, oligopolistic in character."! The fewness
and the size of the enterprises are for a large part dictated
by technical production conditions, and in particular capital
outlay. Also the enterprises, in this case the coal fields,
are located close together, most of them being within a
radius of a few hundred miles of each other. The illustra-
tion on the next page shows the distribution of the ECSC
coal fields.
The High Authority in a report on cartels and concentra-
tions characterizes the ECSC coal industry as oligopolistic
in structure. "Capital-intensive enterprises with high fixed
costs are subject to special production and marketing condi-
tions, which are the reason for both the unusually wide
variety of competitive devices they adopt and their pre-
dilection for restricting competition." 2
The report also states that:
The nature of concentration and of potentially restric-
tive inter-enterprise co-operation frequently differs
very considerably according both to prevailing custom
and to such factors as the state of fiscal and company
Report on the High Authority's Policy Concerning Cartels
and Concentrations Luxembourg, European Coal and Steel Com-
munity The High Authority, April 20, 1964
,
p. 11.
2Ibid., p. 11.
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law in the individual Community countries: this
makes it difficult to compare degrees of concentra-
tion and the scale and implications of particular
restrictive arrangements.!
The report, however, points out that care has been
taken by the High Authority in their assessing the enterprise
pattern at any given juncture. Because of its experience
High Authority believes that concentrations or extensions
of enterprises tend to ensue elsewhere in the market. It
is, therefore, necessary to determine to what extent there
can be said to be sufficient existing balance in size as
among competitors in the markets, with consideration given
to the probable overall trend and to the probable reactions
of the other competitors.
The report emphasizes that there are other points which
should be considered in addition to the size of the concentra-
tions and enterprises. One of these points is the growth of
market interpenetration in the Community which is reflected
by the geographical composition of the relevant markets in
the ECSC . The stronger the interpenetration becomes, the
larger the segments of the market that are liable to be treated
as relevant market for the purposes of making decisions on
cartels and concentrations. A further consideration is the
ability of competing enterprises to make independent and un-
biased decisions concerning competition. The High Authority,
1Ibid .
2Ibid.
22
in accordance with a European Parliament resolution, has
recently in its authorizing decision, made these decisions
subject to specific conditions concerning interlocking
directorates of material links between enterprises, requir-
ing these to be limited in scale to maintain competition.
In considering competition in the ECSC coal industry
and the High Authority's policy concerning this competition,
it is important to realize that the coal industry faces the
oil industry on somewhat unequal terms. The oil industry is
not governed by the ECSC treaty and it is a strong world
wide organization which unlike the coal industry can quickly
shift production and distribution patterns in response to
changes in market conditions. The size and structure of
the coal industry as compared with coal and other fuel in-
dustries is an important consideration of the High Authority
when formulating policy.
In an oligopolistic industry, the industry can choose
to compete not only at a level of full production but also
at other levels of production, and even restrict output
within the industry. It is possible at any level for price
cutting to take place thus creating a situation which could
be harmful to the industry and the Community as a whole.
Realizing this danger, Article 60 of the Treaty requires
enterprises to publish their price schedules. This regulation
J
-Ibid .
,
p. 12.
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is rendered largely ineffective if non-Community suppliers
come forward with low priced quotations based on prices that
are below the total cost of production in hopes of creating
a situation which might enable them to sell later a higher
prices. This is especially true in steel although still
valid in the case of coal.
24
Cartels, Concentrations and the High Authority
In 1952 the first important break in the traditional
sympathetic European attitude toward cartels and monopolies
took place when the European Coal and Steel High Authority
assumed broad antitrust powers including the right to ban
cartels and prohibit mergers. This move has had great in-
fluence on the Community in general as it set an important
precedent for the antitrust provisions of the Rome Treaty
that created the European Economic Community. The main
purpose of this antitrust policy is to prevent cartels and
monopolies from erasing the expansive economic effects of
the customs union now rapidly taking shape. 1
The High Authority derives most of its powers and obli-
gations regarding regulation of the coal industry from
Articles 65 and 66 of the ECSC Treaty. Under these Articles
the High Authority is charged with issuing decisions on specific
cases, either in response to applications for authorization
or on its own initiative. Through its decisions, the Authority
has embarked on a systematic method of making policy in a
structured and interconnected way as cases it rules upon
establish precedent under powers granted by Articles 65 and
66.
^•Franklin R. Root, "Antitrust Policy in the European
Common Market," Notes and Communications Quarterly Review
of Economics and Business
. Autumn 1963 , Vol. 3, No. 3, p. 74
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Article 65 prohibits agreements, decisions, and concerted
practices among enterprises, which tend to prevent, restrict,
or impede, either directly or indirectly normal operation of
competition within the ECSC. It also permits agreements of
specialization and accords intended to market or purchase
jointly specific products provided that this does not work
against the objectives of the Community. Article 66 regulates
Community policy toward concentrations of economic power
rather than cartels. Concentrations which existed prior to
the Treaty are exempt from the provisions of Article 66.
In effect Article 65 is a blanket rule against all agreements
which curtail competition whereas Article 66 specifically
outlaws mergers which interfere with it. In carrying out
the edicts of Article 66 the High Authority judges the
legality of concentrations in light of conditions existing
within the ECSC. 1
It is recognized today that competition is governed by
many factors including the structure of the markets concerned,
the number and weight of market operators, the elasticity of
supply and demand, and considerations of location and the
transport distances. The degree of competition, therefore,
is not easily measured or regulated.
1Schmitt, op_. cit., pp. 105-107.
^Report on the High Authority's Policy concerning Cartels
and Conc entrations , ~0p. Cit ., p. 6.
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The High Authority has realized that regulations estab-
lished under the ECSC Treaty and the specific powers provided
by the Treaty are not adequate by themselves to ensure that
changes and development on the coal and steel market will
take place in an orderly way. The Treaty assumes that,
generally speaking, competition among the firms will be
sufficient to provide this stimulus and direction except in
cases where the High Authority is empowered or obligated to
intervene by means specifically provided for. In the coal in-
dustry this assumption no longer holds when the position of
Community coal vis-a-vis its competitors is primarily deter-
mined by government intervention.
Among the important changes in the position of coal in
fuel market in the ECSC countries has been the tremendous
growth in relative importance of other fuels. Since 1950
and especially since 1957 > the position of the ECSC coal
fields has become one of a precarious balance preserved by
the ECSC authorities. A question remains as to what capacity
should be maintained for reasons either of area policy or of
security of supply.
"Summary of the Introduction to High Authority 15th
General Report" Spokesman, European Coal and Steel Community,
High Authority, March 15, 1967, Luxembourg, p. 2.
2
"Summary of the High Authority's Policy Report"
Spokesman, European Coal and Steel Community, The High
Authority, March 1965, Luxembourg, p. 9.
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Today the ECSC coal industry finds itself in a state of
structural contraction with its production declining, partly
because of increasing competition from other fuels, partly
due to imported coal, and partly due to geological reasons.
This, in some ways, makes it even more difficult to stimulate
competition in the industry.
In light of the above conditions the High Authority
stil] accepts the competitive system and corrective mechanisms
laid down in the Treaty; however, it realizes that these are
not always adequate to attain certain desired objectives.
The High Authority does, however, recognize the importance
of competition as a spur to technical and economic progress.
The High Authority claims to have every intention of seeing
that competition is maintained. There are, however, limits
to this and it is necessary to realize those limits, and to
ensure, by appropriate corrective measures, that the process
of adjusting to circumstances does not fall into general
disorder.
Despite the Community's cartel-like powers, the inten-
tion of the Treaty as well as the work of the High Authority
to date has been to provide a setting and structure for pri-
vate economic activity which readily responds to economic
opportunity.
'Summary of the introduction to the High Authority 15th
General Report, od. cit .
,
p. 2.
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As stated before Article 65 of the Treaty forbids
restrictive agreements and practices of all forms. Article
66 of the Treaty subjects all proposed "concentrations'' of
firms to prior approval by the High Authority. This approval
is to be denied where the result impairs the maintenance of
effective competition.
More specifically Article 65, contains the following
provision: "All agreements among enterprises, all decisions
of associations of enterprises and all concerted practices
tending to prevent, restrict or distort the normal operation
of competition are... null and void and may not be i.nvoked
before any court in the member States. "^
In practice and by the rules of the Treaty the High
Authority has broad sweeping powers to break up any combin-
ation which it feels restricts or forbids competition which
is not in the best interest of the Community. There are
exceptions to this power; for example, the High Authority
has no jurisdiction over agreements and concentrations
affecting "third countries" that is Community dealings with
those outside the ECSC. It might be pointed out that as
conditions now exist, really effective cartelization in coal
extending to non-Community markets is hardly practicable,
Norman J.G. Pounds, and William N. Parker, Coal and
Steel in Western Europe. Bloomington, Indiana University
Press, 1957, p. 362.
2Report on the High Authority's Policy Concerning Cartels
and Concentrations, op_. cit .
, p. 15.
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unless in respect of purely localized markets.
When a concentration is proposed, the High Authority
is required by the treaty to review the proposal and, if it
can not show that certain prohibited conditions will result,
it is obligated to allow the concentration to proceed.
Basically the conditions prohibited fall into two categories.
The first condition is aimed at preventing an enterprise
from emerging through horizontal merger in a position in
which it could control or have decisive influence in the
markets in which it operates. The second condition falls
into the area of preventing an enterprise through vertical
merger from causing maldistribution of resources. An ex-
ample of such a case might be where a steel company, at-
tempting to gain a reliable source of coal, gains control
of coal producing facilities and thus prevents a more ef-
ficient producer from expanding for lack of coal supplies.
What is important is that it is not necessary in some cases
for the enterprises proposing to combine to demonstrate that
their concentration will have any beneficial effects either
for themselves or for the economy of the ECSC.
One of the main purposes of the ECSC is to promote the
improvement of production and it is for this reason that the
High Authority takes an interest in the technical effects of
1Ibid., p. 17.
p
D.L. McLachlan and D. Swann, Competition Policy in the
European Community
, London, Oxford University Press, 1967,
pp. 199-203.
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the proposed concentration. Often one sees in High Authority-
decisions reference made to the improvement of productivity
which will bo gained through a given concentration. V/hat
one must remember in assessing the case is that even if such
an improvement was not expected this might not have been
sufficient reason to forbid the merger. The only conditions
under which the positive effects of a merger are given any
weight in deciding upon the proposed merger is when an
element of doubt exists in reference to the negative criteria.
If such doubt does exist then it is up to the High Authority
to use discretion in making its decision. Usually this
discretion will fall into two areas of consideration. They
are first the positive effects of the merger and second the
size and operations of similar existing enterprises.
Often the High Authority has had to use discretion in
deciding important cases, cases which often set precedent.
This is why so many of the important decisions concerning
proposed concentrations went to great lengths to assess the
positive effects of the combination and the nature of the
other firms in the industry. It now appears that since an
element of doubt exists concerning the negative effects of
many of the proposed concentrations that the positive effects
of proposed concentrations have become an important consider-
ation of the High Authority in deciding upon the mergers.
1Ibid.
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One question that is often asked is why some cartels
and concentrations were permitted. What must be remembered
is that there may have been no sound economic reason for
their approval. Their existence results only from their
approval due at the time of the concentration to the lack
of evidence of prohibited conditions existing. This is why
justification for many of the concentrations approved is hard
to find either by one's own logic or in the publications of
the ECSC.
In making a comparison between American and ECSC anti-
trust regulation, one finds some important similarities
between the two systems.
The American example has been most helpful to
those who drafted Article 85 and 86 of the EEC
Treaty and, earlier, Articles 65 and 66 of the
ECSC Treaty. The first three practices listed in
Article 85 which regulates agreements between
enterprises correspond to per se violations of the
United States law. The fourth practice on discrim-
ination is prohibited in the Robinson- Patman Act, and
the fifth practice outlawing trying agreements resem-
- bles Section 3 of the Clayton Act.l
There, however, are important differences between ECSC
and American anti-trust regulation. Probably the biggest
difference between U.S. and ECSC laws is that the ECSC laws
distinguish between "good" and "bad" contracts, combinations,
agreements, or conspiracies in restraint of trade. This is
all illegal under U.S. law although in deciding punishment
-'Franklin R. Root, "Antitrust Policy in the European
Common Market" 0£. cit .
,
p. 77.
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for offenders performance is taken into account by U.S.
courts. There is a fundamental difference in the underlying
philosophy of the ECSC system as consequences of association
or similar arrangement are explicitly taken into account in
deciding the legality of cases. Another important difference
is in the penalties for violation of such acts. In the ECSC
a violating concern is fined but the management of the guilty
concern is not personally held responsible. In contrast,
in the United States the management can also be held person-
ally responsible and even jailed as in the case of some
General Electric executives who were sent to jail for re-
straining trade in the field of electric power equipment.
The ECSC laws also cover only trade within the ECSC countries
where as the Sherman Act covers both interstate trade and
U.S. trade with foreign nations.
The whole question of market structure and regulation
in regards to coal selling has been bound up by the changing
coal situation in the ECSC. Coal production in the ECSC rose
during the early 1950 's as the ECSC member Countries exper-
ienced a post World War II boom. Coal production reached
its peak in 1956 as the member Countries produced nearly
250 million metric tons of coal. In the period from the
founding of the ECSC to the 1956 to 1958 period the High
Authority was mainly concerned with increasing coal production
Ibid
., pp. 75-77.
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to fuel the growing economies of the member countries. Since
1956 the problem has reversed itself, coal production has
fallen off. The coal mining industry has become a declining
industry due to the competition of other fuels. The import-
ing of cheaper coal, and for geological reasons the demand
for domestically produced coal has been reduced.
A major crisis in the coal markets of the ECSC accom-
panied the slackening in the rate of industrial activity
beginning in 1957 and continuing into 1959. The lowering
in the rate of industrial activity together with a suc-
cession of mild winters and the increased use of other fuels
created a crisis in the coal industry which changed the
position of that industry. Before 1956 all efforts were on
increasing coal production but then in 1952 coal stocks
soared to over 20 million metric tons. After 195$ the
emphasis was changed to seeking a level of output of coal
which would facilitate the production of those types of coal
most suited to the changed market conditions.
Much of the crisis was centered around the inefficient
Belgian pits which had not been closed soon enough. It was
their expensive output that was largely responsible for the
large unsalable coal surplus. The future of the ECSC was in
doubt for a while, but the beneficial effects of steel pro-
duction and prices seemed to overshadow the coal crisis.
W.G. Jensen, The Common Market , London, G.T. Foulis and
Co. Ltd.
, 1967, p. 41.
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Since then coal stocks have fallen to a. more reasonable
level.
-
1-
Coal provided, in 1950, go per cent on the ECSC's
energy supplies. By 1958 coal supplied only 6/,. 5 per cent
.of the energy needs and by I960 this figure had dropped to
59.5 per cent. Meanwhile natural gas had increased its
share of the energy market from 13.1 per cent in 1950 to
27. 4 per cent in 1958 and to 32.3 per cent by I960. As
can be seen from these figures, coal's share of the energy
market is greatly diminishing. 2
In effect the coal industry is experiencing a structural
crisis. Rising costs, especially in some areas like southern
Belgium, together with a lowering of demand have placed the
coal industry in a distressed condition. Efforts on both
the part of the Community government and the individual
member country governments have made an attempt to alleviate
the situation. Efforts have been made to slow or reverse the
trend by cartelization in the fullest. Figures 3 and 4
show the production of coal in the ECSC and indicate the
trend of production. Figure 6 is the number of coal miners
employed below ground which initially fell from 1953 to 1956
due in large part to closing of some inefficient mines and
•Charles A. Cerami, Alliance Bor n of Danger , New York,
Harcourt, Brace and World , Inc
.
, 196-3
,
p. 25.
2Mayne, pp. cit . , p. 45.
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the introduction of more efficient means of mining. The
later sharp drop off of miners employed was probably due in
large part to the fall in demand for coal.
Figure 7 shows the trend in consumption of hard coal and
briquettes, by sectors. It should be remembered that in
Europe the term hard coal refers to all coal except lignite,
not just anthricite coal as the term is sometimes used in
the United States.
On July 31, 1953, the High Authority ordered all agree-
ments which at that time were running counter to the principles
of the Treaty to be dissolved by August 31, 1953, unless an
earlier liquidation date had been set, or unless a request
for authorization had been submitted before the deadline and
was still under consideration at its expiration. Due to the
shortage in the supp3.y of coal at the time, the High Authority
found it necessary to back down at least partially on the
order. As the ECSC's steel production rose and the member
countries enjoyed a post war recovery boom a shortage of coal
developed. Mainly as a result of this the High Authority
found it necessary to accept cartels as temporary devices,
authorized in times of shortage as long as this could be
justified to assure uniform non-discriminatory supplies of
coal to all customers. When a cartel received temporary
sanction under special circumstances, it had to submit to
the High Authority a comprehensive distribution plan before
36
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Figure 7
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Table 1
Movement of the Overall Position of Hard Coal and
Briquettes in the Community1
(000,000 metric tons)
1962 1964 1965
Community consumption 1 253.
2
253-2 237-5
Changes in consumers' stocks 2 - 2-3 "* 0.2 - 0.5
Intra-Community disposals 255-9 253-4 237-0
Exports to third countries 4.8 2-9 2.0
Total demand 260.6 256.3 239-0
Production 3 226.1, 230.1, 220.0
Imports from third countries 23-6 31-1 29-0
Changes in producers' and
importers' stocks - 8-5 » 6.2 -HO.
Total supply 260.6 255.3 239.0
„For household sector sales.
Exclusive of household sector.
3lncluding pitch for briquetting purposes; low-grade products
in tons of saleable coal.
14th General Report of the Activities of the Community
(February 1, 1965- January 31, 1966), o£. cit
.
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The following Figure shows the declining trend of coal
as compared to other fuels as a supplier of fuel energy in
the ECSC.
Figure 8. Shares of the Different Sources of Energy
in the Total Energy Supply of the Six1
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being allowed to proceed.
It should be emphasized that the High Authority exercised
a great deal of flexibility in handing down decisions as the
Treaty only outlines broad principles which the High Authority
must interpret in the way they see fit. Under the terms of
the Treaty the High Authority is required to ensure by its
decisions and actions that a sufficient degree of competi-
tion is maintained in ECSC markets for coal and steel, so
that the general goals of the Treaty may be attained. 2
The effect of the High Authority's policy has been to
approve larger and larger concentrations within the ECSC.
Often the High Authority will use the existence of large
concentrations in countries outside the ECSC as justifica-
tion of large ECSC concentrations.
The size of the biggest concentrations in third countries
is a factor in deciding what is appropriate and permissible
for the ECSC. Jn most economic markets the scale of the
enterprise is largely governed by the general pattern of the
economy and gains its efficiency through the interplay of
all the factors involved. Another important factor in con-
sidering the appropriate size of an enterprise is the size
of other competing firms in the market as well as other
Schmitt , on. cit .
, p. 109.
213th General Report of the Activities of the Community
(February 1, 196/, -January 31, 19~6~S . The High Authority,
Luxembourg, European Coal and Steel Community, March 1965,
p. 164.
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firms in the Community in general. It is the above conditions
that the High Authority considers in its governing of the ECSC.
In light of the above criteria the High Authority does not
feel that uncontrolled concentration has led to para-
monopolistic market patterns and thus lowered efficiency in
the economy at this time.
The High Authority has indeed acted with a flexible
policy concerning combinations. They have sanctioned con-
centrations when they felt that such concentrations would
substantially improve the production of products in question.
Similar circumstances prompted the sanctioning of the joint
sales organization (Aachner Kohlen-Verkauf GmbH) comprised
of three mines in the Aachen area and of an almost identical
combine in lower Saxony (Niedersachsische Kohlen-Verkaufs
GmbH). A combined outlet comprised of several mining enter-
prises was accepted as a more efficient and economic moans
o
of supply than separate marketing by each firm alone. It
was probably the High Authority's reasoning here, as it is
in many cases that although when two concerns merge competi-
tion ceases, the new market position enjoyed by the new
cartel or combination is stronger thus allowing the new enter-
prise to more effectively compete with other firms in its
industry or with closely substitutable products.
1Ibid.
,
p. 164-5.
2 C
"Schmitt, op_. cit .
,
p. 110.
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The above authorizations established within Article
65 of the Treaty,
'
. .
.A clear precedence of Section 2 over Section
1, provided the High Authority found: (a) that such
agreements constituted 'substantial improvements' in
sales and production; and (b) that these 'substantial
improvements' could not be brought about any other
way. The largest subsequent implementation of this
principle occurred, of course, in the Ruhr, where
a 'troika' of three large sales companies obtained
the right to dispose of the output of the largest
coal producing area in Europe.
1
5SSchmitt goes on to point out that "The permissivenes
of Section 2 found still other application. Agreements
violating the letter of Section 1 might be authorized under
Section 2 if the volume of business was negligible." 2
In 1955 the High Authority demonstrated that it could
be hard, as it dealt rather severely with the German scrap-
consumer cartel. It also showed that its generosity con-
cerning sales cartels had limits. The OKU (Oberrheinische
Kohlenunion) Cartel had enjoyed a sales monopoly in southern
Germany for all coal originating in the Ruhr, Aschen, Lorraine,
and the Saar, or two-thirds of the Community's output. This
cartel clearly violated the intentions of the ECSC Treaty.
In the resulting reorganization of OKU by the High Authority
the former sales monopoly received permission to act as agent
for South German dealers in all large production centers of
'-Ibid.
, p. 110.
2Ibid., p. 111.
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the Community. All participants were required to observe
three conditions. First producers could not belong to the
organization. Second wholesalers could either buy from
producers directly or through OKU, but could not do both;
and third membership in the organization must remain volun-
tary. As long as these three conditions were observed,
the High Authority thought that OKU could stay within the
limits of the law as stated in the Treaty. 1
Another difficult and so far not totally resolved case
involved the Ruhr sales cartel Gemeinshafts-Organization
Ruhrkohl, often referred to as GEORG. This powerful organ-
ization was monopolizing the distribution of more than half
the EC5>C's coal-mining capacity. After being broken up by
the Allies into six sales companies, the complex had regrouped
under joint managment. The High Authority, in a series of
controversial decisions, broke up GEORG into three autonomous
concerns. It was soon discovered that these three concerns
were not autonomous in practice as the High Authority had
planned. Inspectors from the ECSC found on an office direc-
tory in Utrecht three separate listings for three concerns
representing Ruhr coal sales, but upstairs they met one agent
acting in fact for all of them. A variety of similar exper-
iences prompted the High Authority to conclude that the set-
tlement was not workable and, therefore, illegal. In 1959
•'•Ibid.
,
p. 112.
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it gave notice to all parties that the existing arrangement
would continue on a year-by-year basis until a new arrange-
ment could be negotiated. Today two selling agencies operate
in the Ruhr and they are discussed later in this report.
Another important case involving a coal monopoly dealt
with by the High Authority involved the French government
supervised monopoly Association Technique de I 'Importation
Charbonniere (ATIC). After concluding their first decision
on the Ruhr coal case the High Authority turned its atten-
tion, under' powers granted by Article 65, to ATIC. In
June of 1956 the ECSC decided that the functions of ATIC
were incompatible with the Treaty. Although the French
government at once offered to reduce the monopoly's role
from outright purchaser to agent, the Community continued
to insist that ATIC constituted an illegal interposition
between consumer and source of supply. A new High Authority
decision of December If?, 1957, reaffirmed that France was
violating the Treaty. Rather than going to court, negotia-
tions continued, with the result that ATIC remained in
existence as "pro-forma" agent in the conclusion of purchase
agreements, but under the supervision of the High Authority,
rather than the French Government. What effects this decision
will have on its ability to end ATIC as a chronic violater of
existing regulations remains to be seen. 1
1Ibid
.
, pp. 112-13.
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During its first five years while operating under
Article 65 no significant experience in regard to penalties
was gained by the ECSC , mainly because there were no known
cartels under the Treaty which had been organized without
High Authority supervision. Regulations and prohibitions
had been formulated in response to requests duly made, or
in response to activities openly pursued.
An important question arises in regard to the action of
the ECSC and the High Authority's attempt to regulate the
ECSC market structure. The question is whether or not
competitive habits can be artificially induced in the coal
industry where structure and peculiar problems have always
discouraged then. Since the founding of the ECSC there has
been no indication of a trend toward more vigorous economic
rivalry among ECSC producers. Evidence would point to the
opposite happening with ECSC mines experiencing difficulty
in competing with imported coal and other sources of energy
such as petroleum and nuclear energy which in the long run
may make them altogether superfluous.
1Ibid
.
,
p. 113.
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Concentrations and The Court of Justice
The highest place of appeal in the European Coal and
Steel Community rests with the seven-member Court of Justice
of the European Community. On occasion the Court has acted
upon cases concerning concentration in the ECSC. In one
such case German Ruhr coal operators carried on a battle
with the ECSC over the legality of creating a unified sales
organization for Ruhr coal. The ECSC forced a number of
reorganizations, but there was a tendency on the part of the
Ruhr firms to return to their saJes pool. Finally in 1962
(Ruhrkohlen-Verkaufsgesellschaften v. High Authority) the
Court forbade the pool and decided that at least three sales
organizations would have to exist in order to meet the
antitrust standards of the Treaty, but there was nothing it
could say in its opinion that would make the Ruhr coal
operators believe it had been economically right. Criticism
of this decision has been quite strong from public relations
offices to the pages of such popular periodicals such as der
Spiegel.
What had happened in the above case was that the Ruhr
mining companies had submitted an application in December of
1959, asking for authorization to set up a single agency to
sell jointly on behalf of all Ruhr collieries. The applica-
tion was withdrawn in February of I960 and after modification
1Clark, o£. crt .
,
p. 128.
h8
resubmitted on Nay I960. The High Authority rejected the
application and the mining companies appealed the decision
to the Court of Justice. The Court dismissed the appeal and
so upheld the High Authority's decision. -1
A similar case was decided against the Belgian coal
mining industry's effort to establish a single tightly-
knit selling agency for all the country's collieries while
the Belgian coal market was temporarily sealed off under
Article 37 of the Treaty, an article giving Belgian coal a
special status due to its uncompetitive situation in compar-
ison to other ECSC coal producing areas. This case was also
decided against the producer by the High Authority which con-
cluded that such an agency would restrict competition too
much.
Finally the Belgian companies, after negotiations, sub-
mitted a new application asking permission to institute
much more loosely-organized joint-selling arrangements, with
some companies left unaffiliated. In January of 1963 the
High Authority gave its conditional approval to the new agency
known as Cobecbar. 2
As for more recent developments in the problem of
authorizing Ruhr coal-selling agencies, the High Authority
Report on the High Authority's Policy Concerning Cartels
and Concentrations, od. cit.
, p. lg.
2Ibid.
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has approved the institution of two separate agencies for
marketing Ruhr coal, which it considers definitely do insure
the minimum amount of competition the Court interpreted the
Treaty as demanding. The Netherlands Government launched
an appeal against the authorization of "Geitling" and "Presi-
dent" selling agencies. As a result of this appeal against
the authorization of the two Ruhr selling agencies, Prof.
Muller-Armach was commissioned to make an inquiry into the
operation of the selling agencies. This report is not yet
2
available.
On April 2Ei, 1965, the High Authority gave permission
for Vereintigti Elektrizitats-und Bergwerks AG(VEBA) to
acquire approximately 60% of the share capital of Hugo
Stinnes AG, both of Germany. VEBA is a holding company owned
exclusively by the Government of the Federal Republic of
Germany. The government controls directly the Saarbergwerke
and Salzgltter company which in turn controls a number of
collieries and dealers including Bergwerkgesellschaft
Hibernia A.G., through VEBA. Hugo Stinnes A.G. controls the
colliery company and Mathias Stinnes A.G. and its distribu-
tion subsidiaries. This concentration brings the share of
the Government-controlled enterprises in total German
1Ibid., p. 22.
2
1/ith General Report of the Activiti es of the Community
(February ]. , 196~jPjanuary 31, 196~5T, Luxembourg, European
Coal and Steel Community, High Authority, March 1966, p. 166.
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production, in 1963 figures, up from 24.6 to 27 .2% for
coal, from 16.8 to 16.5$ for coke, and from l,.lt to 20.4$
briquettes.
In authorizing the VEBA acquisition of the controlling
interest in Stinnos the High Authority satisfied itself
that the enterprises concerned were effectively in competi-
tion with other Community and non-Community coal producers
and with firms marketing substitute fuels. In making its
decision there was no apparent concern over the German
government extending its control into the coal market.
The decision was made on the basis of the firm rather than
the owner, the government, which controls several firms
through holding companies. It would appear from this data
that there is little concern over government control of
firms and the possibility of the government and/or govern-
ment owned firms gaining unfair or too strong control of an
industry. This might be contrasted with a somewhat opposite
situation in the United States where for example some of
the private owned power companies have for years waged a
strong protest over the government control of the Tennessee
Valley Authority.
In several other decisions the High Authority was asked
to rule on concentrations and cartels concerning coal pro-
ducing and marketing firms on the French coast. In one case,
1Ibid., p. 173.
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four coal-producing and distributing firms applied to form
a joint company pooling their plant for crushing, screening,
and washing imported coal. Three of them wished to form a
second joint company, pooling their briquetting plants. In
this case the High Authority concluded in its ruling that
insofar as they are industrial, the relevant operations
aim at rationalization, which is desirable and indeed
frequently essential. After they satisfied the High Authority
'
order that they be isolated from the commercial operations
and agreements which were not essential to the industrial
operations, the concentration was approved.
The High Authority also ruled in favor of a merger of
two coal mining concerns on the basis of rationalization of
production even though they were comparatively largo pro-
ducers. The High Authority's policy had been where coal
mining is involved to fix 7,500,000 tons annual capacity,
or 3 per cent of the total output of the common market, as
the maximum permissible concentration. One notable exception
to this rule was when it allowed the combination of two Ger-
man mines, Hibernia and Emscher-Lippe Bergwerke AG, with a
combined annual capacity of 11,100,000 tons. The High
Authority argued that it was applying Article 2 of the Treaty
which called for a rationalization of production. Since the
coal fields of these two firms were adjacent, they reasoned
1Ibid., p. 176.
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that a pooling of management could be expected to bring
about a more economical use of the resources available
through the lowering of overhead costs by joint use of
existing power supplies. This large cartel accounted for
about five per cent of the mining capacity of the Community. 1
••-Schmitt, op_. cit .
, p. 11/,.,
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Vertical Concentrations
Within the European Coal and Steel Community, vertical
concentrations today involve a large portion of coal in-
dustry. Although the High Authority rules on vertical
mergers they do not usually consider them very important
in their literature.
It, however, is important to look at the vertical con-
centration situation in the ECSC for two reasons. First,
it maybe possible to shed some light on why the High
Authority does not consider them important and to see if
in fact they do not comprise a significantly large portion
of the ECSC coal output. Secondly, there has been a consid-
erable amount of suspicion and fear surrounding mergers
between steel and coal firms mainly as a result of a high
degree of such concentration during and before the Second
World War, especially in Germany.
"Nevertheless, the dramatic view has prevailed in many
ideologically disparate quarters that a resurgence of giant,
cannon-making steel barons in western and central Europe is
not only inevitable, but is being aided and abetted by the
European Coal and Steel Community." 1 Such an assessment that
would predict a resurgence of the old steel and coal barons,
especially in Germany, appears from both a political and
1Ibid
.
,
p. 115.
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economic standpoint, to be wrong. As will bo stated and
elaborated on, many of the steel concerns have found the
conditions of the 1930' s and 1940' s when the steel concerns
owned a large portion of the coal mines to be conditions
which should be avoided today for such reasons as the high
cost of much of the coal production in the ECSC as compared
to imported coal. Also many of the so-called old cannon-
making barons are experiencing severe difficulties and
finding their operations too widely diversified at the
present time. One old coal and steel giant, Krupp, has
had to diversify its control and undergo a vast reorganiza-
tion just to remain in operation. One popular business
magazine reports on "The Fall of the House of Krupp" and also
reports that Freidrick Flick, another giant in the steel and
coal industry of Germany of the thirties and forties has
diversified and dropped a large portion of its steel pro-
duction and most of its coal production.
Suspicions of new or regained vertical concentrations of
steel and coal were quite widely shared, especially during
the early and middle 1950' s and were mainly based on the
assumption that steel companies would make an effort to safe-
guard their coal supply in times of shortage. The High
Authority considered the steel companies' desire to safeguard
"-James Belli, "The Fall of the House of Krupp" Fortune
August 1967, Vol. LXXVI, No. 2, pp. 72-81 plus.
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their coal supply a legitimate goal. It even conceded that
steel producers acquisition of coal mining operations some-
what in excess of their normal needs was good practice. As
long as such vertical combinations reflected no attempt to
escape competition and did not constitute a dominating posi-
tion in the price structure of any substantial part of the
market, the High Authority would be likely to give its
approval.
After the change in the coal market from shortage to
glut in about 1957 the High Authority was quick to realize
that vertical concentrations where steel producers gained
control of coal production might someday work against the
owners. They realized that in some cases American coal
could be used at a lower cost thus leaving the steel com-
panies with mills which would become increasingly uneconom-
ical. The High Authority, therefore, realized, that it was
important that coal producers increase their efficiency of
operation. The High Authority has, therefore, initiated a
program to help increase efficiency in coal mining. However,
geography and geology frequently make increased efficiency
difficult if not impossible. The High Authority appears not
to consider the possibility of a coal mining operation becoming
a burden on its owner as a criterion for rejecting a merger
application. No objections were raised by the High Authority
Schmitt , op_. cit.
, p. 115.
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over the Hoesch firm's acquisition of the Altenessen Mining
Company or over Luxembourg's Acieries Reunies de Burbach-
Eich-Dudelange (ARBED) acquiring the control of Bergbau A.
G. I.othringen. Each of these mines produced about three
per cent of the Community's output. It was felt that this
capacity was not large enough to give the owners a control-
ling position in any market. In neither case did a vertical
merger come close to challenging the enforcement of Article
66.
1
Table 2 and Figure 9 give a comparative vi ew of ECSC
Steel producer concentration and those of selected countries.
Table 3 gives some indication of the nature of some of
the concentrations, both horizontal and veritcal that have
taken place in the ECSC in regard to the comparative size
and the nature ofthe concentration. Table 3 is not a complete
listing of all concentrations formed under the ECSC as it
only covers the period 1953-195^, a period mostly character-
ized by growth in the coal sector. The table, however, is
valuable in that it does give an indication of the compara-
tive size and nature of typical concentrations within the
ECSC.
J-Ibid.
, p. 115-6.
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Table 2
Compara tive
Distribution of Steel Production among
the 7.0 Lr.rga-it Enterprises of the Community,
Japan, Britain and the Unite d States,
1960-62
Order of enterprises or E. C s. c. Japan U. K. U.S.A.
groups of enterprises 1960-61
%
1961-62
%
I960
%% (1) % (2)
I 7.9 9.7 24.7 12. - 28.2
2 7.2 7.9 17. 2 11.6 15. 5
3 6.7 7.2 10.4 10. 1 8.6
Top 3
4
21.8 24.8 52.3 33.7 52.3
5.8 6.7 6.9 10. 1 5.5
5 5.4 5.8 4. 5 8.6 4.7
6 5. 1 5. 1 4.3 6.6 4.6
7 5. - 5.- 3. 8 6.6 4.6
8 4.7 4.7 3.6 6.3 4.4
9 4.3 3.9 2.8 6. 1 2. -
10
Top 10
11
3.9 3.4 1.6 4. I 1.9
56.- 59.4 79.8 82. 1 80. -
3.4 3.2 1.4 2. 5 l.n
12 3.2 3. - 1.4 2.2 1.4
13 3. - 2.9 1.2 1. 3 1.3
14 2.9 2.9 1.2 1.4 1. 3
15 2.9 2. 3 0.9 1. 1 1. 1
16 2. 3 2. 2 0.8 1. - 1. -
17 2.2 1.8 0.8 1. - 1. -
18 1.8 1.8 0. 7 1.- 0.8
19 l.S 1.7 0.7 0.8 0.7
20
Top 20
1.7 1.6 0.6 0.7
81.2 82.8 89. 5 94.6 90.9
(U. K. top 19)
All other enterprises 18.8 17.2 10. 5 5.4 9. 1
100 % !'.)) ,-: 100 % 100 % 100 %
Note; TheE.C.S.C. figures show the distribution (l) before and{2) after
the~At:gust Thyssen-Htitte/Phoenix-Rheinrohr concentration. Although
this was finally authorized only in 1963, for the s;-ke of comparability
1961 has been u :;ed a s the reference year for both columns.
The E. C. S. C. Lorenz curve in the accompanying graph has been plotted
from the figures in the first column.
Report on the High Authority's Policy Concerning
Cartels and Concentrations, ojj. cit .
,
p. 1,0.
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Figure 9
COMPARATIVE DEGREES OF CONCENTRATION IN THE
E C S C JAPANESE, BRITISH Al'O AMERICAN
'
STFEL INDUSTRIES (LORENZ CURVES)
"
"~20
~n W 17 « IS M 13 12 11 10 ? 8 7 6 5
J 3 2 1
M„M8)( ><><>(>(>(><> limillM ' »MMMM«
Ibid.
,
p. 1*1.
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Table 3
Nature and Extent of Concentrations on the Common Market
for Coal and Steel under the Provision of Article 66,
ECSC Treaty, 1953-195^
Horizontal Concentrations Type of Production Nature of
and Share of Com- Concentration
mon Market
I. Coal mines
Consolidation/Essener
Steinkohle
(Germany)
Hibernia/Emscher-Lippe
(Germany)
II. Coal wholesalers
Balland-Brugneaux/Ets.
Macle-Meisset
(France
)
Coal 2%
Coal 5%
Acquisition of
majority interest
Acquisition of
shares
4% of French Merger
coal consumption
Vertical Concentrations Type of Production Nature of
and Share of Com- Concentration
mon Market
I. Steel and coal
Mannesrcann AG/Consolida- Steel 3% Merger
tion (Germany) Coal 2%
Hoesch AG/Altenessen ykiriu Hoesch bought
Mining Co. (Germany) shares of
Altenessen
Klockner Werke AG/
Konigsborn-Werne 3%/2% Acquisition of
(Germany) majority in mine
August Thyssen-Hutte/
Erin Mining Co. Less than k% Acquisition of
( Germany
)
Less than .5% majority in mine
ARBED/Lothringen Mining 5%/3% Acquisition of
Co
.
( Luxemburg- Germany
)
majority in mine
Huttenwerk Oberhausen/ hfo/2% Acquisition of
Neue Hoffnung (Germany) majority of shares
Phoenix-Rheinrohr AG/ %M° Acquisition of
Enscher-Lippe (Germany) majority of shares
•^Schmitt, op. cit .
,
pp. 117-118.
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At the end of World War II the Allied powers attempted
to make it economically impossible for Germany to wage war
on her neighbors again. One method of achieving this end
was thought to be to break down much of the industrial
vertical concentration and in the case of steel make the
steel producers divest themselves of their interests in coal
mining. The Schuman plan replaced the Allied powers in
attempting to achieve this end and Schmitt reports on the
difficulties and success of the ECSC in regard to this
problem.
It wan not to take long before the reconcentration of
German enterprises, a question so conveniently ignored
during the ratification debates, came of concern to the
High Authority because of vociferous criticism of its per-
missive policies. On April ft, 1955, Michel Debre addressed
an inquiry to the High Authority which concluded: "It
appears confirmed that, despite commitments made at least
before the French parliament, important i-cconcentrations
operate in Germany now, and that others are in progress."
The High Authority responded by maintaining that it was ruled by
the Treaty of April 1ft, 1951, which formed the ECSC, and not
by Allied legislation dealing with Germany after World War
II. But the High Authority's case consisted of more than
passing off the situation as not their responsibility. It
Schmitt, on. clt.
, p. 119.
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was common knowledge that the Allies had separated or given
orders for separation of German coal mines from steel mills
and had broken up the great steel concerns. "Everyone,
except Debre" states Schmitt "also granted that the
Community could not discriminate against Germany without
cutting its own throat." An important question remained,
"What danger lurked in the regrouping of these artificially
separated components?"-
A new trend resulted in a number of vertical concentra-
tions where German steel firms either regained control of
mines they formerly held or else gained now controlling
interests in mines. Among these vertical concentrations
were Mannesmann AG acquiring Consolidation, thereby con-
trolling 3% of the Steel production and 2% of the coal pro-
duction in the Common Market, Hoesch AG acquiring Altenessen
Mining Co. controlling 3% each of the Common Market steel
and coal production. Also Klockner Werke AG was reunited
with Konigsborn Werke producing 3% and 2% of the Common
Market's steel and coal respectively. August Thyssen regained
control of Niederrheinische Hutte and in turn acquired Erin
Mining Co. producing less than 4a> and .% of the Common
market steel and coal. None of these mergers conflicted
with Article 66 and none of them resulted in control of
large portions of Common Market coal or steel production;
1Ibid.
,
pp. 119-120.
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however, they did indicate perhaps the beginning of a trend,
one that could evoke concern throughout Europe in light of
past experience.
Many, including the High Authority, questioned the effec-
tiveness of Allied deconcentrations. The evidence pointed
to at least partial failure of the Allies to achieve their
goal of separation of the large steel producers from their
coal supplies. An example of this was the Mannesmann firm
whose stockholders, even during the period of supposed
separation, retained 76. 4 per cent of the interest in a
large mining concern of which Consolidation was a part.
During the successive reorganizations the amount of coal
that Mannesmann was supplied by Consolidation was not
affected. When Huttenwerk asked for a permit to merge with
Neue Hoffnung Mining Co. the largest block of stock in both
enterprises, 35 per cent, was owned by the Haniel family.
It appeared that reorganizations of these concerns were little
more than paper work. It became obvious that under all of
the conditions that had existed few if any German coal mines
in The Ruhr functioned separately from the steel industry. As
of early in 1957, 7h per cent of the Ruhr coal was controlled
by the steel industry. This condition may change in the
future, but not by actions of the High Authority but by an
increasing burden of these mines on their owners due to the
-"-Ibid .
,
pp. 117 and 120.
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cost of Ruhr produced coal compared to alternate supplies
of energy.
1Ibid
. , pp. 120-121.
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PROBLEMS ASSOCIATED WITH THE DECLINING DEMAND FOR COAL
Coal and Substitute Fuels
The increased use of substitute fuels for coal has had
and will in the future have increasingly important effects
on ECSC coal. The ECSC nations are forced, due to a lack
of natural reserves, to import almost all of their petroleum
and a large portion of their natural gas. This has resulted
in a struggle which is intensifying between domestic and
imported fuels, oil, gas, and coal which has complicated
the integrated coal market of the Community.
*
Imported energy is generally less expensive in Western
Europe than indigenous energy. In light of this it is felt
that the ECSC is correct in minimizing for member nations the
balance of payments effect of energy imports. From an econ-
omist's viewpoint the ECSC "Countries have a comparative trade
advantage in manufactured goods; they should be interested
in inexpensive energy, export their manufactured goods, and
import their energy 'gap.'" Unfortunately there are other
political and economic factors which must be taken into con-
sideration, when considering policy toward imported energy.
Community investments and employment of workers and other
Hans G. Mueller, "Efficiency of Resource Use: The Case
of the European Coal and Steel Community" Communications,
Southern Economic Journal. Oct., 1965, Vol. XXXII , Ho. 2,
p. 222.
L.E. Grayson, "Towards a New Energv Pattern in Europe"
Southern Economic Journal Vol. XXVIII, No. 1, p. 81, July,
1951:
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factors enter into the picture when considering the desir-
ability of imported energy. The need for a single unified
energy policy in the ECSC countries is being realized. This
is now beginning to be realized with the ECSC working with
Euratom. As the directorate of the ECSC is being absorbed
into the EEC provisions are being made for a more unified
control of all fuel energy usage. Also both the ECSC and
the EEC have made studies on the feasibility of such a common
policy and are beginning to put some of the proposals from
these studies to work.
Individual governments have attempted to avert or
alleviate serious hardship to the collieries and the miners
caused by imported energy. If such National Governmental
intervention does not involve the collieries in actual
restriction of competition, the High Authority cannot
intervene under Articles 65 and 66. The High Authority has,
however, done a great deal of study in this area and both the
High Authority and the European Parliament have repeatedly
drawn attention to the desirability of amending the anti-
restrictive provisions in line with the present situation.
However, due to decisions by the Court of Justice, Article
65 has not been successfully amended and the High Authority
is obliged to enforce the treaty as it now stands.
There have been some fears voiced that the coal pro-
ducers in the ECSC may be increasingly absorbed by concentra-
tion by the coal consumers. It should be pointed out that it
is not uncommon in Europe for consumers to ban together in
66
cooperatives to form a united front in the purchasing and
distribution of goods and services. An example of a cooper-
ative formed by consumers would be the large petroleum pro-
ducts cooperative in Sweden "Oljekonsumenterna-OK" or trans-
lated the Oil Consumers Association. It can be argued, how-
ever, that structural difficulties in the coal sector and
the strides being made by alternative energy sources make
such fears of absorption invalid.
The spectre of ''giantism" that is held up in
some quarters in view of the tendency, for technical
reasons, for production units to increase in size may
be discounted, especially as it is the High Authority's
principle in approving concentrations to ensure that
a sufficient degree of competition is maintained.
Hence in concentration policy the purely quantitative
aspect takes second place to other considerations:
these include in particular the elimination of inter-
locking directorates and of certain types of delivery
contract, which would be liable to impair adequate
competition among the large units.
1
The High Authority's Report on Cartels and Concentra-
tions, od. c i t
. ,
p. 10.
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Imported Coal and Problems Involved
Since the ECSC began its recovery after the Second
World War, it has imported coal from foreign nations most
of which came from the United States. As can be seen in
Table 4 coal imports rose rapidly from 1952 through 1957
reaching a peak of about 43 million metric tons. Coal
imports to the ECSC were 29.1 million metric tons in 1965
and dropped slightly to 27-6 million metric tons in 1966 and
were expected to be 27.5 million metric tons in 1967. ECSC
exports of coal are very minor compared to imports, amounting,
to 475 thousand metric tons in 1965 and 465 thousand metric
tons in 1966. " Switzerland was the largest customer for
ECSC coal as they have traditionally purchased coal from
the Ruhr receiving it by boat via the Rhine. Other major
customers of ECSC coal are Austria and the Scandinavian
countries. Exports of ECSC coal have been dropping signifi-
cantly from 1.675 million tons in 1958.
The ECSC has found itself in a very undesirable situation
in the production of coal. Many ECSC mines are inefficient
due in part to the fact that the coal seams are located far
below the ground. For these geological reasons and, to an
Europe Agence Internationale D Information Pour La
Presse, Luxembourg ECSC, Daily Bulletin No. 3989 February
27, 1967.
2Ibid
. ,
Bulletin Mo. 3743, April 5, 1966.
3Ibid.
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Table 4
Imports of Coal into ECSC
Importing Country 1952 1957 1959 I960 1961
Belgium 1,173 2, £20 1,437 93A ^
France 5,361 9,701 2,173 1,632 2,363
Germany (F.R) 7,397 17,234 5,956 5, h 61 5,601
Italy 5,007 3,305 6,336 6,166 6,740
Luxembourg 6? 15
Netherlands 2,707 5,384 3,336 3,30/, 3,134
Community 22,2.12 43,959 19, 2/, 3 17,747 13,669
extent, economic reasons such as Increasing labor costs, the
cost of producing coal has been quite high, especially when
compared with coa] from the United States. It is because
of this that imports of coal to the ECSC have risen. One
source states that some of the ECSC countries are buying
American and Russian coal for $11 to $12 a ton compared to
the European price of between $14 and $17. Imported coal
has created problems in the ECSC. One of the major problems
has been the threat to domestic coal producers which has
been partially met by import quotas and subsidies. By far
1ECSC1962 on. cit.
2,:Curbs Urged in Coking Coal Imports by ECSC," Journal
of Commerce , Nov. 1.3, 1966.
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the majority of the coal imported into the ECSC comes from
the United States. The United States with its very efficient
coal producing ability has been strongly promoting export
of coal. Unlike the ECSC countries, both the United States
and the USSR are planning to increase their output of coal.
This is an indication that both nations plan to continue
their strong attempts to sell coal in the ECSC countries.
It might be noted here that the efficiency of Soviet
coal production is about the same as that in the Federal
Republic of Germany and slightly higher' than that of other
ECSC producers. The price of Soviet coal, decided by the
Soviet Government often for political reasons, is set to
compete with American coal on the ECSC market.
American coal has created many problems, both economic
and political, in the ECSC. The High Authority's report to
the Council of Ministers of the EEC states that the "Commun-
ity mines may be able to satisfy the growing needs of the
Community's iron and steel industry for coking coal quanti-
tatively, but that the price position is much less satisfac-
tory." 3 The High Authority also believes that prices of
1-The C oal Situation in Europe in 1963/1964 and Future
Prospects , Economic Commission for Europe, New York, United
Nations, 1965, p. 64.
Productivity of Und erground C oal Workings , Economic
Commission for Europe, Hew York, United Nations, 1965,
p. 189.
^Europe Agence Internationale D Information Pour La
Presse, Luxembourg, Daily Bulletin, February 25, 1965, P- H-
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coking coal are uneven throughout the ECSC . Prices of
coking coal for the steel industry are highest in the Saar,
South Germany, Belgium and Luxembourg and are lower in both
East and West France and North Germany, as well as in the
Ruhr basin. The iron and steel industry has delivered
prices for coal about 5% lower than the Community average.
Italy and the Netherlands are particularly well placed to
use American coal, which they find cheaper than Community
coal.
There is a difference of opinion as to how much cheaper
American coal is than ECSC produced coal. Exact price com-
parisons are not possible, because of the difficulty of
establishing a reliable basis for comparison. "It is common
knowledge that the bulk of Community-produced coals are no
longer sold at the official ECSC ex-pit prices and the cost
of American coal naturally depends on whether they are based
on spot or time charter. ''^
The High Authority has made several studies in attempt
to determine the actual cost difference between American and
Community produced coal. After one such study they reported
that "After looking into the possibility of long term supplies
from the USA, the High Authority's experts have come to the
1Ibid.
^Tugendhat, Dr. Geog. "Coal and Steel Search for Solution,"
The Times (London) No. 56,724, August 31, 1966, p. 13.
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conclusion (hedged about with many reservations) that the
Community could get its crude steel produced about 40 cents
(US) per ton cheaper if the proportion of American coke
supplied to the industry were raised to 25$. The gain would
be about a dollar per ton if 50$ of the coke used came from
the USA. 1
The Times of London in an article by Dr. Georg Tugendhat,
reports that a statistical study was recently released by
the ECSC which indicated that German steelmakers generally
pay between 25 per cent and 35 per cent more for their coking
coal than other ECSC steel producers with the Italians paying
the lowest prices. American sources claim that the price
differential between the landed cost of American coking and
Ruhr coals of comparative quality is at least $$ a ton.
Ruhr spokesmen who, of course, wish to minimize the
difference, claim the difference is not more than $1.50 a
ton on average. The differential is, of course, of vital
importance as it determines not only the ultimate cost of
any subsidy operation but also whether it is possible to
eliminate the impact of higher German coking coal prices by
some other means. -'
^Europe Agence D Internationale Pour La Prosse, op. cit.,
Feb. 25, 1965, p. 11.
^Tugendhat, op_. cit .
3lbid.
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The coal crisis in Germany, the ECSC ' s biggest coal
producer, has caused severe political problems. Dr. Tugendhat
reports that "The Social Democrats' victory in the election
in Rhi neland V/estphalia. . .was undoubtedly helped by the
Christian Democrat Union's lack of a concrete policy for
coal." 1
Germany began in 1959 to protect her own coal producers
froin imported coal. She began by placing a six million ton
annual duty free quota on imported coal. Coal imports above
this amount, were for all practical purposes excluded from
the German market by a $5 a ton duty. Attempts were made to
get this quota raised, especially during 1966, but German
coa] producers and labor representatives always countered
such requests with fears that such an increase would cause
large amounts of unemployment among coal miners. A signifi-
cant increase of more than 4 million tons would mean reducing
working time and lay-offs for the German miners.
3
German coal importers, however, have argued that coal
imports ought to have been allowed to participate in the
growth of Germany's fuel and energy needs. This has not been
the case as since 196] , fuel oil and natural gas have been
virtually the only commodities to cash in on increased needs.
J-Ibid .
2Jess Lukomski
, "Germans' Hopes Dim on U.S. Coal Import
Rise," Journal of Commerce
,
August 3, 1966, p. 1 & 22.
3lbid.
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Yet imported coal, notably from the United States could well
have made a contribution to the lowering of German energy-
costs.
One trade group, the Association of German Coal Im-
porters in Hamburg, has pointed to the current difficulties
of the German steel industry. They contend that unlike its
Benelux, Italian and French competitors, Germany has been
prevented from cutting its coke costs by not being able to
use less expensive imported coal. This the association
claims has brought about a deterioration of the German mills'
competitive standing.
Mildred M. Loveless of the Coal Exporters Association
of the United States, Inc. states the view of many American
coal exporters when she reported to the 1966 annual meeting
of that group the following:
We know that some of the Coal and Steel Community
nations are shutting down uneconomic and high-cost
mines, reducing their coal output. As you know,
many of our customers want to buy more American coal,
but cannot for political reasons. A shortage of
miners compounds the mining problem for some of our
European competitors, and there have been recommen-
dations by some of the European experts to cut back
coal production even further. On balance, I think
we can predict that U.S. coal exports will continue
to expand, although perhaps not as rapidly as we
would like.
3
"Germans Ask Expanded US Coal Imports," Journal
merce, July 11, 1966.
2Ibid.
Report of Mildred M. Loveless, Assistant Secretary to
the 21st Annual Meeting of the Coal Exporters Association of
the United States, Inc. June 21, 1966. unpublished.
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In the future the United States may be able to deliver
coal in the ECSC at an even lower comparative price as new
larger coal-carrying vessels are being built in several
nations including France, Italy, and Japan to meet the in-
creased demand for US coal.
The ECSC is by far the United States largest customer
for coal as it accounted for 42 per cent of US exports in
1965, taking some 21.3 million net tons of bituminous coal
and 103,000 tons of anthracite coal. 1
Due to developments in the ECSC and especially Germany
which have caused large surpluses in stocks of coal, the ECSC
has had to take action to attempt to diminish or resolve
this problem. The ECSC expects its hard coal production
to drop slightly in the next few years, but it realizes
that it will have to help to protect ECSC coal mining oper-
ations. The High Authority expects hard coal production
potential in the ECSC community to drop from a high of
229-6 million metric tons in 1966 to 209-3 million metric
tons in 196? then continue to decline slowly reaching 198.2
metric tons in 1970. 2
The High Authority in dealing with the problem of coal
production has now together with the community member nations,
instituted a subsidy system for steelrnaking coking coal.
1Ibid .
2
Investment in the Community Coalmining and Iron and
Steel Industries, Luxembourg, European" Coal and Steel Com-
munity (The High Authority), July, 1967, p. 13.
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Community Subsidy for Steelmaking Coking Coal
As a result of pressures brought on by low cost imported
coal and by comparatively inefficient Community coal produc-
tion, the High Authority approved on February 21, 196?, a
subsidy system for steelmaking coking coal.
The decision allows member governments to provide sub-
sidies to coal producers in their countries with the purpose
of helping to bring the price of coking coal and coal used
for steel production and produced in the F.CSC down to a level
competitive with imported coal. The subsidy may be paid at
a flat rate of $1.70 per ton or at a varied rate averaging
$1.70 per ton with a maximum subsidy set at $2.20 a ton.
The decision also authorized the governments to institute a
joint financing system up to a maximum of $22 million which
will help to cover the cost of subsidies for coal and coking
coal which is delivered from one member country to another
for use in steel making. A condition is made that coal
prices may not be reduced to a level lower than that of
imported coal .
The subsidies are to be financed on the basis of a kO
per cent contribution by the coal producing country, and 60
per cent by the F,CSC countries jointly in the following
"Subsidy System for Steelmaking Coking-Coal, High
Authority Decision," Spokesman Luxembourg, European Coal
and Steel Community, The High Authority, February 22,
1967, p. 1.
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ratio: Germany and France: 28 per cent each; Italy: 14
per cent; Belgium: 11 per cent; Netherlands: 10 per cent;
and Luxembourg: 9 per cent.
The High Authority justified this decision on the basis
of Article 95 Number 1 and 2 of the Treaty which covers
cases not specifically provided for in the Treaty.
The total cost of the maximum initial program will be
shared in terms of actual dollar outlay as follows:
Table 5 ?-
German Federa] Republic 11.7 million dollars, namely 53$
France 3.8 17.
4
Belgium 1.9 8.4
Netherlands 1.6 7
Italy 1.8 8.4
Luxembourg 1.2 5-4
There were several reasons for the new subsidy including
the existence of rather large although no* decreasing coal
stocks. ECSC coal stocks fell by 596,000 metric tons to
35,320,000 metric tons during May, 1967, largely as a result
of the ECSC's efforts to bring output into line with the
depressed demand for coal. Stocks were reduced by 499,000
metric tons in Germany, 77,000 metric tons in the Netherlands,
10,000 metric tons in Belgium, and 4,000 metric tons in Italy.
Although coke stocks were also reduced in Hay, 1967, by some
99,000 metric tons, they still totaled 7,240,000 metric tons
1lbid.
2Ibid.
,
p. 2.
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which was 1,900,000 tons higher than the May, 1966 level.
The total number of cool mine face workers in the ECSC
dropped by 5,000 during Kay, 196?, to a total of 327,000.
From May of 1966, through May of 1967, 52,000 miners left
the coal industry. Financial help during this period was
given to 3,700 workers affected by total of partial closing
of ECSC installations in Germany and the Netherlands. •*
Not all are satisfied with the new subsidy program.
Some, especially the Germans, feel that it does not go far
enough toward solving the problem. On November 9, 196'/,
Chancellor Kissinger disclosed a series of significant,
though disputed, bills designed to bolster Germany's sagging
coal industry and to aid the government owned railway system,
which uses and transports coal, at the expense of the German
trucking industry.
The plan calls on Germany's coal industry which at that
time was burdened with a surplus of some 20 million tons of
coal to establish a single national corporation which would
supposedly operate profitable mines and close unprofitable
ones. The government by leaving the industry under private
operation hopes to avoid some political problems which are
quite serious especially since miners in the Ruhr Valley held
"Coal Stocks Drop," European Community
, Brussels pub-
lications Department of the Communities, September, 1967,
No. 105, p. 13.
"West Germany Unveils Proposals to Aid Coal Industry and
National Railway System," Wall Street Journal. November 9,
1967, No. 92, Vol. XL, o. 9.
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noisy demonstrations during late 196?
•
More specifically the German coal plan calls for special
government aid for the Ruhr area to ease the impact of jobs
lost in coal mining and to attract new industry to the area.
Special payments of up to $1,250 would be given to miners
who are forced to seek new jobs. Subsidies from the govern-
ment of 10$ on new industrial investments in the area and
for expropriation of land for new plants would be made.
The new plan also calls for the oil industry to continue
its present policy of voluntary restraint in expanding its
operations in Germany so as to not cause increased pressure
on the coal industry. Presently the oil industry has been
holding expansion to a maximum of l,% annually for light-
fuel oils and 3% for heavy fuel oils. The proposal calls
for expanded coal-marketing effort outside Germany and the
continuation of tariffs on coal imports until 1970.
*
The German government recently proposed that all long
hauls of bull; items like coal be banned from the highways
by 1970 in hopes of increasing the use of the German rail-
ways. Final action on this proposal has not yet been taken.
The actions taken by the ECSC which have included subsidy
programs, quotas, and tariffs point to a need for a fuel
policy in the ECSC which would work to solve the long run
1IMd.
2Ibid.
3 Ibid.
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problems rather than making temporary efforts to patch over
without really solving the problem.
Professor Austin Robinson of Cambridge University working
for the OEEC Energy Advisory Commission published a report
in I960 which outlined a broad policy and a set of goals.
Basically Robinson puts his primary emphasis on energy cost
and the freedom of consumer choice. Since in the ECSC
countries imported energy is usually less expensive than
domestically produced energy, he believes that having an
increasing share of energy supplied by imports is probably
good. He views the ambitious coal and nuclear power expan-
sion programs as mistakes. Robinson appears to make his
decisions on economic concepts such as cost, price, and
consumer's choice rather than on political criteria. There
are many important political problems involved such as
satisfying the desires of the people involved in the pro-
duction of ECSC energy that might make Robinson's proposals
less feasible.
Grayson, op. cit ., pp. gl-2.
go
Labor and Social Programs in the ECSC
Under the responsibilities vested in it by the Treaty,
the High Authority has formulated broad social policies to
protect the workers in the coal industry. To protect the
workers from severe social hardship from economic change
the High Authority has adopted the following goals; "No
factory will be abandoned, and no worker will be allowed to
lose his job, until arrangements have been made to retrain
workers, new factories built and new opportunities for em-
ployment created. "l
By 1970, the ECSC coal industry expects to mine 185
million metric tons of coal compared with 210 million tons
in 1966. The ECSC now faces the problem of cutting back on
community coal production without forcing large numbers of
miners into unemployment or underemployment without compen-
p
satjon.
During 1966 employment in mining in the ECSC, most of
which was in coal mining, fell by 62,000 men or 10 per cent
of the mining population. In addition, short-time working
caused a production loss of 4-5 million metric tons of coal.
-"-Ten Years of the Coal- Steel Common Market
,
Luxembourg,
The Spokesman of the ECSC ' s High Authority and the European
Community Information Service, 1963, p. 24.
2
"Europe's Coal and Steel Situation Reversed since 1951,"
European Community
. Brussels, Publications Department of the
European Communities, No. 102 April-Kay 1967, p. 19.
3lbid.
,
p. 19.
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The social policy of the High Authority is aimed toward
two main objectives. The first is the protection of the
worker and his living standards. The second is the active
promotion of projects to raise living standards and improve
working conditions. To ensure continuity of income the High
Authority has granted financial assistance to miners and
mines. The High Authority gave such assistance during the
coal crises of 1958 when because of the excessively high
coal stocks mines would otherwise have been compelled to lay
off more workers.
Basic to the High Authority's program in this field, has
been what the Treaty calls readaptation, that is, the retrain-
ing and re-employment of workers threatened with unemployment.
The reason for readaptation is to help ensure that workers'
living standards do not bear the brunt of technological pro-
gress and economic development. Readaptation is also designed
to maintain the morale of the workers.
Readaptation and industrial redevelopment are two examples
of the High Authority's influence on general economic policy
in the ECSC . When asked for financial aid by a government,
the High Authority considers the request on the basis of effect
on the entire working population of the ECSC as well as the
''Social Policy in the ECSC,'' Community Topics, London,
European Community Information Service, 1966
,
p . J~7
2Ibid.
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area concerned and also considers the overall economic
equilibrium. By the payment of allowances to discharge
miners and the granting of loans for the expansion or es-
tablishment of production facilities to provide new employ-
ment, the High Authority attempts to present pockets of low
purchasing power from forming. By maintaining workers'
income, the High Authority has helped to revitalize the
entire economy of each area. Readaptation and redevelop-
ment because of the multiplier effect of the capital in-
vestment undertaken have become instruments of general
economic policy.
In commenting on the effects of readaptation and rede-
velopment, the ECSC maintains that without these policies,
the modernization and rationalization of the coal industry
would not have been possible without serious social disrup-
tion. Prices of domestically produced coal would have
increased sharply. The subsidies needed to have brought
these prices down to acceptable levels would have been
2enormous.
Although the High Authority does have the power to give
financial assistance, it was not intended under the Treaty
that the High Authority have the power to conclude agreements
fixing wages or working conditions throughout the Community.
1Ibid
.
,
p. k
2Ibid.
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Therefore, the High Authority has found it necessary to use
subsidy, loans, and other indirect means to attempt to main-
tain wages and working conditions at levels consistent with
their goals.
One of the major areas of support given to the coal
industry by the High Authority is in its support of occupa-
tional training. Much of the occupational training support
rendered by the High Authority takes the form of exchanges
of information, ideas arid experience. In striving toward
this end the High Authority establishes committees and working
parties which meet regularly to organize seminars, study ses-
sions and fact-finding missions. They also publish reports,
studies, annual information bulletins and catalogues of
training aids.-'-
The High Authority, operating under powers given it by
Article 5/, of the Treaty, provides financial support for
companies which decide to build training centers to meet
present-day needs. These centers reflect changes brought
about by technological advances.
Occupational training has basically gone through three
periods since 1953- The first period, 1953 through 1956, was
a period largely devoted to studying the problems of appren-
ticeship and to the training of miners. This was a period
1Ibid., p. 6.
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of expansion in coal production in the ECSC. However,
employment during this period dropped from 685,900 to
648,300. This drop in the number of miners was largely due
to improved technology.
The second period, from 1957 through I960, focussed
attention mainly on the problems of training managers and
instructors. Greater cooperation between the member govern-
ments, the High Authority, and industry was experienced
during this period. Due to a decision to change its program,
on March 16, 1961, the High Authority entered the third
period of occupational training activities. The object of
the new program was to support the measures being taken in
the different member countries to adapt the training of
miners to the needs of technical and social progress and to
provide systematic advanced training for all the staff. The
program covers technical personnel as well as sales, adminis-
trative and managerial staffs up to the highest level.
With the increased technology in mining it is becoming
more important for the employees to have increased skills to
operate the mines. In the coal mining industry, there has
been a steady increase in the last few years in the number of
apprentice tradesmen such as fitters, mechanics, electricians,
electro-mechanics, and similar occupations both in absolute
1
"ECSC 1962,' op_. cit.
2
"Social Policy in ECSC,' 1 op_. cit., p. 6.
figures and in terms of proportion of total personnel. It
therefore, seems likely that the occupational training pro-
grams instituted by the High Authority will remain important
as they have been in the past, for at least the near future.
Readaptation, retraining and re-employment, has been a
major area of concern by the High Authority. Until February
9, I960, the High Authority made its decisions under Section
23 of the Convention containing the Transitional provisions
attached to the ECSC Treaty. On this date the power's expired.
On Marc}) 29, I960, Article 56 was amended under which the
2High Authority now operates in this area.
Until February 10, I960, and again after March 29, I960,
the High Authority has undertaken readaptation projects for
miners who have lost their jobs because their undertakings
had been forced to close down or they had been displaced by
changing technology. From March 29, I960, to January 33,
1966, the High Authority had contributed to the readaptation
of 103,441 workers providing $26.2 million. The Governments
concerned provided an equal sum of money. From March 18,
1954j to January 31, 1966, the High Authority allocated a
total of $65. 4 million which was matched by the six member
Governments, for the retraining and re-employment of 218,150
workers, four-fifths of whom were coalminers.
1Ibid
.
, p. 7.
ZIbid., p. 8.
3 Ibid
. , pp. 8-9.
86
Readaptation works basically in the following way.
Tiding-over and differential allowances are used as tempor-
ary wage compensations. For a predetermined period of time,
the worker receives an allowance, in a fixed amount and in
some cases on a descending scale, amounting to between &0%
and 100$ of the wage he was earning before his discharge.
The tiding-over allowance is designed to carry him through
the waiting time until he finds employment, perhaps after
retraining. This differential allowance helps him if he
takes a job, that, either permanently or during an initial
adaptation period, pays less than his previous job. It makes
up part of the difference between the two wages. Resettlement
grants are also available if the worker is obliged to move
to another location to assume his new job. Detailed arrange-
ments and amounts of aid vary from country to country depend-
ing on local conditions and the agreements negotiated by the
individual country and the High Authority. l
The High Authority has been quite successful in its
readaptation program in that with the exception of a very
few workers in the coal industry in Italy, due to an almost
uninterrupted ready demand for labor, most displaced workers
,
except for the older workers have been able to find work
quick] y.
1Ibid.
,
p. 9.
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Industrial redevelopment has been another area in which
the High Authority under the amendment of Article 56 has
been active. Here an effort has been made to move industries
into areas with large numbers of discharged miners in an
effort to keep the areas from becoming depressed. In this
area the High Authority works with the Common Market Commis-
sion and the European Investment Bank. The national Govern-
ments have the most say in the redevelopment programs.
The High Authority has made loans for industrial
redevelopment to absorb redundant coal and steel workers in
five member countries amounting to $17 million during 1966.
From 1952 through 1966, the High Authority lent $/,6 million. 2
When an enterprise borrows money from this program,
they are required to hire a substantial proportion of their
new employees from the ranks of the displaced ECSC workers.
Many problems, however, do still exist in the labor
sector- in the ECSC. The differences that continue to exist
even between different regions of the same country, are
indications of the extreme difficulty of achieving harmoniza-
tion on a Community scale. Living and working conditions
are often governed by economic factors, such as the state of
labor supply, and by sociological factors, such as the relative
size and influence of employers' and workers' organizations.
1Ibid
.
,
p. 11.
2
"Europe's Coal and Steel Situation Reversed since 1951."
op . cit
.
These factors create problems when trying to formulate and
carry out policy in the ECSC.-1-
Another problem that faces the High Authority is that
of training new workers for the future. Although there is
an abundance of miners at present, mining is not a very
attractive occupation, and because of the increasing standard
of living in the ECSC countries, there is some concern over
miners for the future. The High Authority has anticipated
this problem and through training programs has attempted to
keep the supply of new workers entering the coal industry
in balance with the expected need for such workers in the
future.
Another area of concern to the High Authority is that of
housing for ECSC workers. As of September 1, 1965, the High
Authority had contributed financially to the construction of
some 92, k 76 dwellings of which 5#,507 were for renting and
33,97? for owner-occupation. Of these dwellings 70,922 had
been completed, 15,403 were under construction and 6,162 were
in the planning stage. Out of the $7&2.24 million required
to build those projects the High Authority arranged to loan
$230 million. The High Authority's loan never exceeds 50
per cent of the total construction cost and is lent in most
cases at about 1 per cent rate of interest.
"""Social Policy in the ECSC," op. cit .
,
p. 12.
2lbid., pp. 15-16.
&9
Under Article 55 the High Authority is concerned with
health, safety and medicine. Involvement here usually in-
cludes the coordination of scientific work, the financing
of research, and the dissemination of information. The High
Authority is especially involved in work concerning mine
safety.
At present efforts are being made to draw up a long
term social-development program and to coordinate the pro-
grams more closely with the other member groups of the
European Community. It seems likely that problems of dis-
placed miners will continue for at least the next few years
as the coal industry in the EC3C continues to contract.
90
CONCLUSIONS
During the years that the ECSC has been in existence it
appears that one of the biggest concerns of the High Authority
has been in maintaining competition among the firms that it
regulates. The High Authority has had to deal with markets
whose firms have always been prone to cartels and concentra-
tion. The High Authority appears to have made no radical
changes with the past but it has attempted to regulate and
in some cases even challenge some cartels and concentrations
in the ECSC. When the High Authority felt that a combination
was flagrantly violating the rules of competition they were
not afraid to act such as in the case of GEORG and ATIC
.
They often found that the best they could do was to com-
promise on a decision which sometimes returned some competi-
tion to the market. This is especially true in the case of
vertical combinations where the High Authority has not been
able to change the market. The Nannesmann firm's ability to
hold on to its control of coal production in spite of what
regulatory groups have done is an example of this. The fact
that in 1957, 7 A per cent of the Ruhr coal was controlled by
steel firms indicates that much vertical concentration does
exist. Probably a more important consideration here is that
the High Authority has been quite successful in keeping the
vertical concentrations from gaining strong control of the
coal markets of production facilities horizontally, that is
for example not allowing one steel producer to gain a strong
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control of the market for coal used in steel-making in his
region.
In the ECSC an application for combination can be denied
under the rules of the Treaty if it appears to meet certain
negative criteria, that is if it appears that the combination
would cause certain conditions which were forbidden by the
rules of the Treaty. If there is little doubt that the com-
bination would violate the negative conditions outlined in
the Treaty, then the combination is automatically approved.
There is no requirement that the applicant show that the
combination will be beneficial to either the ECSC or itself.
It is because of this rule together with precedent and per-
haps the High Authority's reasoning that combinations might
lead to increased production that so many combinations and
cartels were approved or allowed to exist in the community.
This is to say that at least some of the cartels and concen-
trations exist in the ECSC for no positive or beneficial
reason at all except perhaps to satisfy the desires of their
owners.
A very important factor in the goals and the planning of
the ECSC is that of a co-ordinated fuel policy.
The ECSC in the time of crises followed separate national
plans too closely rather than implementing its own Community-
wide plans. Such plans as national subsidies in place of
Community-wide subsidy programs were probably in most cases
not in the best interests of the Community. Another failure
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was the unwillingness of the national governments to accept
the ECSC proposal for uniform cuts in production and imports,
"Rejection was based largely on French and German objection
to the production quotas. They argued (correctly) that much
of the crisis was due to Belgian insistence on protection of
its inefficient mines and that these mines should, therefore,
bear proportionally more of the adjustment." 1 The ECSC has
now undertaken a program to reorganize the Belgian industry.
This illustrates that in effect the national governments do
have a great deal of power in ECSC, perhaps a power stronger
in ability to cripple rather than build long range programs
designed for the betterment of conditions in the entire
Community.
The ECSC has has some success in its social programs,
especially in the area of retraining and housing workers
and in industrial redevelopment of some of the areas where
coal mining has declined.
Unfortunately, in some cases, regulation has recently
meant more, not less, restrictions and barriers to market
viability. This is the case with recent German announcements
of new subsidies. What is needed is a policy in the ECSC
which will be Community-wide in scope and will develop a
satisfactory energy market unhampered by rules that prevent
proper allocation.
Richard L. Gordon, "Coal Price Regulation in the European
Community, 1946-1961," The Journal of Industrial Economics ,
Vol. X, No. 3, July, 1962, p. 201.
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The long term goal of the Community members should be
to provide inexpensive energy. Since the Community countries
generally have a comparative trade advantage in manufactured
goods, they should concentrate on exporting these manufactured
goods and import their fuel when it is less expensive than
domestically produced fuel.
What is most strongly needed is an effective common
fuel policy, one that would cover and coordinate the use of
all fuels, a policy that would have as its objective the
supply of inexpensive fuel and the elimination of uneconomic
fuel sources.
It will not be until such a common fuel policy is realized
that the basic purpose of the ECSC will be realized, that of
a supply of fuel at a "best" price for the entire Community.
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This report reviews the Activities of the European
Coal and Steel Community from its inception in 1951 to date.
It emphasizes two aspects of the administration of the coal
industry by the ECSC. These aspects are the policy toward
competition and the adjustment of the Community to the
declining market for coal since 1957-
The European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) was formed
by treaty on April 18, 1951- The six nations to sign the
treaty were Belgium, France, the German Federal Republic,
Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands. The ECSC was formed
to create a large and more efficient market for the produc-
tion and distribution of coal and steel and to supply coal
to the customers of the ECSC at a reasonable or best price.
The ECSC through its governing body, The High Authority,
has worked to achieve the goals of the Community which are
outlined by the principles of the Treaty. Central to these
principles of an efficient Community with a good supply of
coal at reasonable prices, is the regulation of firms in the
ECSC in terms of pricing and competition.
The High Authority requires that firms under its juris-
diction publish and adhere to approved price schedules. The
High Authority has been quite successful in receiving cooper-
ation from the coal industry in the application of this
requirement.
The High Authority is required to approve all concen-
trations among firms under its jurisdiction. It has attempted
to promote competition in industries which have traditionally
been prone to cartels and concent cations among both producers
and distributors. The record has been one of permissiveness
in granting approval for concentrations, partially due to the
Treaty requirement that applicants automatically be granted
permission if they do not violate certain negative criteria
such as restriction of competition. The traditional acceptance
of cartels and concentrations also seems to explain the
tolerant attitude of the High Authority toward such arrange-
ments.
From the inception of the ECSC until 1957 the High
Authority made a concerted effort to increase coal production
in the ECSC to meet the rising demand for it. After 1957 the
coal market changed from one characterized by excess demand
to one characterized by excess production. The rise of other
fuels as suppliers of energy to the Community together with
the availability or less expensive imported coal and increasing
costs in many of the ECSC coal production areas have turned
ECSC coal industry into a declining industry.
The ECSC has initiated a broad plan subsidies for pro-
grams of readaptation and retraining. This plan is intended
to help the coal industry improve its productivity and to
lessen the harmful effects of the decline of production on
the workers in the industry, the industry, and the Community.
The ECSC coal industry is an industry with a structure
characterized by oligopoly. In some areas vertical concentration
is quite prevalent such as in the Ruhr where about 74 per
cent of the coal production is controlled by steel firms.
Horizontal concentration is also quite prevalent in some
areas. An example would be the sales cartels in Belgium
and in the southern portion of Germany.
The ECSC will have to develop an effective fuel policy
plan and program covering all forms of fuels if it is going
to realize the goals of the Community of providing fuel for
the customers of the Community at prices which will be best
for all of the Community.
